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BOOK REVIEW
THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. By Kenneth W. Dam.t University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1982. Pp. 382. Reviewed by Kenneth
D. Auerbach.tt
During a conversation about the float of the British pound and the
devaluation of the Italian lira, former President Nixon remarked as to
the float of the pound, "[it's too complicated for me to get into ..."
and as to the devaluation of the Italian lira, "I don't give a (expletive
deleted) about the lira."' The President's response probably mirrors a
widespread perception about international monetary affairs. There-
fore, Kenneth W. Dam's book, The Rules Of The Game.- Reform and
Evolution in the International Monetary System, 2 is a welcome addition
to the literature in this area because it explains monetary affairs by
interweaving legal, economic, and diplomatic considerations. The
Rules of the Game is written for those "lawyers who shy away from
international monetary matters under the impression that the econom-
ics is too difficult [and] the institutions too mysterious."3 The book
serves as must reading for both the professional involved in interna-
tional monetary affairs and for the informed generalist seeking to un-
derstand international financial developments.
Organized historically, the volume analyzes the interaction be-
tween substantive/procedural rules and the political and economic pe-
riods of the past one hundred years.4 Throughout the volume, two
central concerns link the discussions about each political and economic
period: the type of exchange rate regime5 and the type of reserve as-
t Deputy Secretary of State; Provost and Professor of International Legal Studies,
University of Chicago.
tt B.A., Union College, 1968; M.A., Political Science, Indiana University, 1969;
Ph.D., Political Science, Indiana University, 1974; J.D., The National Law
Center, The George Washington University, 1983; Associate, Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, D.C.
1. A.F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 1 (1977). The quote
is from a transcript of a meeting between former President Richard Nixon and
H.R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972, which was released pursuant to the order of the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1976).
2. The book is hereinafter cited as THE RULES OF THE GAME.
3. THE RULES OF THE GAME XV.
4. The specific political and economic periods covered are: The Gold Standard Era
(1870-1914); the Interwar Period (1919-1939); the Bretton Woods Era (1946-1971);
and the Floating Exchange Rate Period (1972-present). In addition to this histori-
cal and legal analysis, THE RULES OF THE GAME also presents a concise introduc-
tion to the international monetary system.
5. An exchange rate regime is a set of rules or practices that national monetary au-
thorities obey to alter the rate at which their currencies may be exchanged for
other currencies, gold, or valuable assets. Changes in an exchange rate regime
arise from the growth of new rules as the "old rules no longer corresponded to
monetary reality." THE RULES OF THE GAME 6. Rule changes depend, in Profes-
sor Dam's analysis, upon the accumulated departures from the rules of an existing
monetary regime. Id at 5. This departure forces the "international community to
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set.6 This review addresses Profesor Dam's analysis of monetary re-
gimes and the political and economic periods in his book.
All exchange rates are determined by transactions in the market
place. When national monetary authorities refrain from intervening in
the market place and the exchange rates are set by supply and demand,
a "floating exchange rate system" operates. "When national monetary
authorities enter the market either on the buying or selling side to as-
sure that the [exchange] rate bears a close relationship to an officially
specified rate,"7 a fixed exchange rate system operates. Of course, na-
tional monetary authorities may advocate a floating exchange system,
and yet at times intervene in the national market. This creates a so-
called "dirty float," and when followed, makes the exchange rate re-
gime take on the attributes of both a fixed and floating system - espe-
cially a floating system if the margins around the official rate are wide.
In addition to rules and practices about market intervention, mon-
etary regimes determine which assets will be considered numeraires.
Generally, numeraires consist of reserve assets such as gold, reserve
currencies, or special drawing rights (SDRs).8 The significance of
these reserve assets is that national currencies are valued against and
traded for them. In addition, sellers of depreciating national curren-
cies9 prefer to hold such reserve assets because they are widely accepta-
ble in settling international accounts. Professor Dam views "[tihe
history of. . .international monetary systems [as,] ...in part, ...
the shifting mix of [such] reserve assets."'" Consequently, his book de-
scribes and analyzes the events and practices that created this shifting
mix - events which ultimately produced the change from the gold
standard to the Bretton Woods System and beyond.
During the Gold Standard Era, currency was valued against gold
(the principal reserve asset) at a fixed parity price, paper currency was
fully convertible into gold, coins were valued by their gold content, and
gold was available for public or private transactions. In his discussion
recognize that the system itself has changed, [a]nd [that] ...a flurry of rule
changes is likely to follow." Id
6. Reserve assets are those currencies or valuables (e.g., gold or silver) which are
held by national monetary authorities for intervention in currency markets.
7. THE RULES OF THE GAME 8.
8. THE RULES OF THE GAME 9. For a discussion of SDR's see notes 40-42 and ac-
companying text.
9. Depreciation occurs when the price of a foreign currency rises relative to a domes-
tic currency. Thus the domestic currency depreciates and the foreign currency
appreciates. See P.A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 611 (1 1th ed. 1980). The term
devaluation is largely of historical application, originally referring to an officially
induced increase in the currency price of gold. Although there is no longer an
official price of gold, the term is important in discussions about monetary matters
referring to official increases in the price of a currency in terms of another cur-
rency or the SDR. See id
10. THE RULES OF THE GAME 9 (italices omitted). Gold, silver, the British pound, the
American dollar, and the SDR are or have, at one time, been used as reserve
assets.
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of the gold standard, Professor Dam compares the widely believed
myths about the system with its actual operation. I ' One of these myths
is that the system automatically corrected both trade deficits and infla-
tionary expansion." Another myth presupposed that a booming Eng-
lish economy based on the gold standard would have an automatic
check against inflation. 3
In reality, however, the gold standard was not quite the automati-
cally self-adjusting mechanism that these myths suggested. As Profes-
sor Dam notes, statutes fixed the lowest price that the Bank of England
paid for gold bullion, but nothing prevented the bank from paying
more. 4 Moreover, the fixed selling price for gold coins "did not pre-
vent the Bank from charging more for gold bars, so long as it was will-
ing to make [gold coins] available at [the statutory] price when there
was a shortage of bullion in the market."' 5 Thus, the Bank could dis-
courage gold outflows by manipulating the price. To stimulate gold
inflows, the Bank could pay an importer's brokerage charge or buy the
gold upon shipment, in effect granting the importer an interest free
loan.1 6 These and other "gold devices" helped induce some modest
11. In his book, Professor Dam notes: "[ilf the automatic self-adjusting concept of the
old standard is a myth, it is a myth that was widely believed at the time or was
astily created after the demise of the gold standard at the outset of World War
I." THE RULES OF THE GAME 15.
12. The First Interim Report of the Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges
after the War (1918) (the Cunliffe Committee) illustrates this: Suppose a balance
of payments deficit (resulting in an outflow of gold) existed in England during the
use of the Gold Standard. This would eventually cause the Bank of England, a
private commercial bank as well as the central bank, to raise the rate at which it
would discount commercial paper - a normal response to declining reserve rates.
The increased discount rate would force banks to raise interest rates for commer-
cial loans, which in turn would make capital spending more expensive. With re-
duced capital spending, unemployment would increase eventually lowering the
wage rate and prices. The increase in interest rates would also reverse the outflow
of gold as investors took advantage of the now higher interest rates and increase
their investments in England. Imports to England would then decline in the face
of higher prices (in terms of the pound). Eventually exports from England would
increase as lowered prices and wages, measured in pounds that now could be
purchased cheaply in terms of foreign currency, made English exports less expen-
sive. The end result would be a stimulus for employment and production in Eng-
land. THE RULES OF THE GAME 15-17.
13. The following, also from the Cunliffe Committee, illustrates this: As credit ex-
F ands and prices increase, the demand for currency by both the public and banks
to maintain their proportion of cash to liabilities) would increase. Eventually the
demand would be passed to the Bank of England which would have to raise its
discount rate in order to prevent a fall in its currency reserve. In turn, as noted
above, the increased interest rates would dampen economic activity. Id
14. THE RULES OF THE GAME 25, 34.
15. Id at 34.
16. Id at 35. In addition, Professor Dam analyzes other departures from the rules of
the gold standard. For instance, countries went on and off the gold standard and
intervened in the market to maintain official exchange rates. Moreover, central
bankers loaned foreign currency to one another to defend a parity rate and dis-
courage decisions to make currency inconvertible. Id at 37-38.
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flexibility in the gold market (located in London) and allowed the Bank
to counteract inflationary expansion and balance of payments deficits
before their full effects were experienced.
England's position as the major trading and financial center aided
the myths that surrounded the gold standard. Because England was
the world's principal creditor, the pound became an international cur-
rency, widely acceptable for account settlements not only between
debtors and England but also among third and fourth states inter se.
As a result, the Bank of England came to be known "as [the] central
banker to the world."' 7 In fact, "London as a financial center was the
principal source of liquidity for the international monetary system of
the time."' 8 Thus, the pound supplemented gold holdings as an inter-
national reserve asset.
The legal foundations of the gold standard rested far more heavily
upon national legislation and central bank practice than upon interna-
tional agreements. Professor Dam suggests, therefore, that the gold
standard as an international legal order is better characterized as a
nonregime, because it resulted from a series of national decisions that
reflected national interests. His reasoning for this assertion is threefold.
First, the system's linchpins of freely-convertible, gold-backed curren-
cies, and free trade in gold by private parties were enforced by national
legislation.' 9 Second, except for the short-lived Latin Monetary Union
(1865-1871) and some international conferences primarily concerned
with the roles of gold and silver, only the informal "rules of the game"
(i e, the personal understandings for acceptable behavior among cen-
tral bankers) hinted that the gold standard might be an international
regime. Finally, even though the lending among central bankers to en-
courage allegiance to the gold standard intimated the existence of an
international regime, such lending seems to have been much less com-
mon during the Gold Standard Era than during the Interwar Period
and the Fixed Exchange Rate regime.' 0 Despite the character of the
international aspects of the gold standard or the methods of its opera-
tion, Professor Dam views the gold standard as having provided signifi-
cant monetary stability during a period of increased trade.2'
Professor Dam describes the 1919-1939 period both as remarkably
consistent with the pre-World War I regime and as the precursor of a
new system after World War II. In this section of his book, Professor
Dam demonstrates how the events of this period shaped international
monetary policy. For example, governments regulated foreign cur-
rency transactions, used foreign currencies to stabilize exchange rates,
and increased paper currency in circulation to promote economic
17. Id at 30.
18. Id
19. Id at 24-26.
20. Id at 37.
21. Id at 38-40.
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growth. Moreover, the wartime practice of international consultation
on economic and financial matters increased. The formation of the
Economic and Financial Commission of the League of Nations, and
the Brussels (1920), Genoa (1922), and London (1933) economic con-
ferences constituted fledgling steps in international economic diplo-
macy through multilateral forums.22 Not only did the central banks
begin to cooperate formally and legally during this period, but they
developed a "practical and personal" relationship creating an interna-
tional network of like-minded bankers who opposed political control of
monetary affairs.23 But, as Professor Dam points out, with increased
government involvement in domestic and international economic af-
fairs arising from the Depression, monetary affairs surrendered to gov-
ernment intervention, thus undermining central bank independence.24
Professor Dam also demonstrates how the events of this period
were inconsistent with the rules of the gold standard. In this regard,
the author describes how, one by one, the principles of the gold stan-
dard yielded to the economic and political realities of the time. Indi-
viduals no longer had rights to redeem paper money for gold. Paper
currency proliferated as domestic legislation decreased the gold back-
ing for currency. Only a few countries remained as gold centers with
free gold markets, keeping their currencies redeemable in gold.25 What
emerged was a gold exchange system in which reserves would be held
as either gold or foreign exchange. After the economic collapse and
political and military conflicts of 1919-1945, demands for an organized
international economic order increased.
In 1944, forty-four governments sent representatives to Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire to plan the post-World War II monetary sys-
tem and to take steps for global reconstruction and development. Plans
for two institutions emerged: The International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (The World Bank) 26 and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), each with its own legal personality, charter (Articles
of Agreement), and sphere of activity.27 Professor Dam thoroughly
22. Id at 50.
23. Id at 52.
24. Id at 53-54.
25. As to these countries, Professor Dam notes that "[a] given quantity of gold in the
vaults of a central bank [in a gold center would serve] as reserves, not simply for
the gold center country but also at one remove for those countries that held its
currency as their foreign exchange reserves." THE RULES OF THE GAME 57 (foot-
note omitted).
26. Professor Dam's analysis centers on the International Monetary Fund's evolution
and organizational make-up. Therefore, this review will not discuss the World
Bank and its operational intricacies.
27. Formally called The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference (Bret-
ton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944), the Conference hammered out the
structures of The World Bank and the IMF. The organizations are designed to
serve different purposes: The IMF oversees and facilitates international monetary
affairs, while The World Bank lends capital to countries unable to obtain financ-
ing from commercial sources on reasonable terms. For a history of the World
19831 Book Review
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discusses the IMF organization and its evolution; however, his discus-
sion will only be highlighted here.
The IMF is an international organization of states, and each mem-
ber state is required to contribute a share of the IMF's assets. Each
member's share - its quota - is payable in gold and national cur-
rency.28 A country's quota ultimately affects both the member's voting
rights in the IMF and the member's ability to use the Fund's resources
to correct short-term balance of payments deficits.29
Prior to the creation of the IMF, there was substantial agreement
among the post-war planners that changes in exchange rates were of
international concern. As a result, extended discussions ensued both
before and during Bretton Woods on proposals concerning the extent
to which the IMF should be allowed to affect a member's decision to
alter its exchange rate. A compromise provided that: (1) changes in
exchange rates should be allowed only to correct a "fundamental dise-
quilibrium" and only after consultation between the member and the
IMF, which could object (except for a one time only ten percent
change); (2) changes not authorized by the Articles could lead to a cut-
off of the Fund's resources or to a forced withdrawal of the member;
and (3) "fundamental disequilibrium" was left undefined. 31 Subse-
quent events show how prescient the negotiators were, because "only
on one occasion did the [IMF] ever. . . treat an exchange rate change
as unauthorized. . .[and] it became apparent that a key problem...
was not the instability [of exchange rates] but rather an unwillingness
[of governments]. . . to make. . . changes promptly enough. . .. "'
The IMF Articles of Agreement created a par value system of
semi-fixed exchange rates. The United States guaranteed that it would
Bank, see E. MASON & R. ASCHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrON WOODS
(1973). For the historical perspective of the IMF from 1946 to 1971, see HOR-
SEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNiD 1945-1965: TWENTY YEARS OF
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION (1969) and M. DE VRIES, THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND: 1966-1971: THE SYSTEM UNDER STRESS (1976).
28. THE RULES OF THE GAME 101.
29. The chief executive officer of the IMF is called the Managing Director. Each
member appoints a governor to the IMF, usually the member's finance minister or
head of its central bank, who may cast the votes alloted to the member. The
Board of Governors meets as a body at its annual meeting.
The IMF equivalent to a board of directors is its Executive Board, which
currently comprises 22 Executive Directors. The five members of the IMF with
the largest quotas each appoint one director to cast its votes. If the one or two
members whose currency holdings by the IMF are most below their quotas have
not already appointed a director, then that member may appoint a director. AR-
TICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XII, § 3(a)-(c) (1945 & 1978 as amended). Currently,
there are 6 appointed directors and 16 elected directors. The remaining members
of the IMF elect the other directors, and each of them then casts the votes that
comprises the coalition of members that elected him. The Board of Governors
may increase or decrease the number of elected directors by an 85% majority of
the total voting power.
30. THE RULES OF THE GAME 89-90.
31. Id at 91-92.
buy or sell gold at the established price of thirty-five dollars per ounce,
and each member expressed the par value of its currency in terms of
dollars or gold. Thus the members implicitly accepted a reserve role for
gold. Members were obligated "to buy and sell foreign exchange [at
the official price] ...in order to prevent the market [price of their
currency] from rising above the upper margin or falling below the
lower margin, ' 32 which was set at one percent above or below par. As
Sir Joseph Gold, the former General Counsel of the IMF, wrote: "the
system of par values in practice was a solar system in which the U.S.
dollar was the sun."'33 Nonetheless, gold retained its luster as a reserve
asset of the IMF.
As a currency pool, the IMF makes foreign exchange available to
members to meet short-term balance of payments problems under cer-
tain circumstances. As a legal regime, the IMF interprets its Articles,
which record the evolution of rules of international monetary relations.
Professor Dam characterizes the IMF's rule-making techniques as in-
terpretation and legislation.'
In characterizing the IMF's interpretation duties, Professor Dam
analyzes conditionality,3 changes in exchange rates, and the role of
gold in order to demonstrate how events, ambiguities in drafting, and
concern for the consequences of alternative rules produced evolution-
ary change in international monetary relations. For example, the Arti-
cles left ambiguous the question whether a member would have
automatic access to the IMF resources. Under the original Articles, "a
member shall be entitled to buy the currency of another member";
however the purchasing member must represent that it has an immedi-
ate need for this currency to make "current payments which are consis-
tent with the provisions of [the Articles]. 36 In Professor Dam's
opinion not "only is the latter clause ambiguous as to whether a mem-
ber has automatic access to the IMF's resources, but it also raises issues
as to which provisions of the Articles are drawn into consideration by
the 'consistent with' requirement. ' 3  The resulting interpretation by
the IMF allowed members virtually automatic access to the "gold
tranche" (ie., the part of a member's quota subscribed in gold) but the
32. Id at 94.
33. Id at 94-95. (footnotes omitted).
34. Id at ch. 5. Dam also employs the concept of "jurisdiction" to indicate that the
IMF and the international monetary system are not coterminous. Institutions
such as the European Payments Union, the Bank for International Settlements,
and the Group of Ten also affect international monetary affairs. The discussion
here, however, will only focus on "interpretation" and "legislation." THE RULES
OF THE GAME 142.
35. Conditionality refers to the policies in accordance with which a member may ob-
tain access to IMF resources beyond the "gold tranche." The "gold tranche" is
that part of a member's quota which is subscribed in gold.
36. Id at 108. The purchasing member is required to reverse its purchase transaction
with the IMF after a certain time.
37. Id
19831 Book Review 597
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IMF could place conditions on drawings beyond that amount. As a
result, members make representations about their need for and in-
tended use of IMF resources, and the IMF may look beyond those rep-
resentations. Thus, international concern for a member's economic
policy is brought to bear upon the member.
As an example of IMF legislation, Professor Dam presents a dis-
cussion of the Special Drawing Right (SDR) based on extensive cita-
tions to publicly available sources and commentary. In brief, two
international economic issues of the 1960's were the rate at which inter-
national reserves were growing and their composition, which included
gold, foreign exchange (especially the dollar), and unconditional
claims, such as a member's gold tranche position in the IMF. To pre-
vent appreciation in currency, certain national monetary authorities in-
tervened in currency markets to buy dollars. Thereafter, some of these
monetary authorities continued to hold dollars as the United States'
balance of payments deficits increased. Countries that held dollars
could insist that the United States honor its obligation to convert dol-
lars to gold. Conceivably, as Professor Dam notes, this could have cre-
ated a panic if the dollars to be exchanged exceeded the United States'
gold supply valued at the official price.3 Despite three earlier efforts to
solve this "liquidity" problem, ie. increases in member quotas, agree-
ments to permit the IMF itself to borrow from countries having curren-
cies convertible into the dollar, and swap agreements among central
banks (which are essentially reciprocal lines of credit) the members leg-
islated the creation of the Special Drawing Right (SDR).
Professor Dam's analytical description of the SDR emphasizes the
legal and economic aspects of the IMF's solution to the liquidity prob-
lem. The SDR is both a unit of account and a reserve asset, allocated in
proportion to quota and created without any backing in the form of
additional international reserves.39 But as Dam extensively illustrates,
38. Kenneth Dam notes:
[D]ependence on the solvency of the reserve countries is ... an Achil-
les' heel of a gold exchange system that was not widely perceived when
the Bretton Woods planners drew their lessons from the interwar experi-
ence.
This dependence put considerable pressure on many countries to
refrain from converting their dollar holdings into gold .... This...
led to the argument that a new form of liquidity should be found that
would not have the disadvantage of generating disputes over the compo-
sition of reserves and would not threaten the very underpinnings of the
Bretton Woods system.
THE RULES OF THE GAME 145-46.
39. In analyzing the SDR, Professor Dam states:
mhe decision to forego any backing ... simply shifted the issue to the
attributes the SDR had to be given to make it acceptable to national
financial officials. In the end, acceptance could not be left to chance, and
an 'acceptance obligation' - a kind of international legal tender re-
quirement - had to be negotiated. Just as national legal tender statutes
normally require creditors to accept the national currency in the dis-
[Vol. 12
the SDR regime had to contend with the reluctance of central banks to
engage in such novel ideas without first having available a complex set
of regulations which defined the interest to SDR holders, the valuation
of SDRs (and changes in valuation), and the mechanics of subsequent
allocations of SDRs.1 In each discussion, Professor Dam summarizes
the contending positions, evaluates their logic, and clearly indicates
how the solutions balanced conflicting economic interests while con-
structing procedural and substantive rules for the SDR regime.4
Like his discussion of the gold standard and the inter-war period,
Professor Dam presents the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as a
series of events that challenged the system's fundamental premises.42
First, deficit countries were presumed to have the burden of changing
exchange rates, usually by discrete devaluations. Three countries, how-
ever, permitted a float of their currency for a limited time and then
pegged the new rate at the end of the period, thus making floating a
respectable option.43
The dollar, already under threat during the 1960's, continued to
weaken, and the United States' gold (valued at the official price) equal-
led about twenty-five per cent of the total outstanding dollar liabilities
at the end of 1970. "External liabilities continued to mount rapidly
.. .[aind, ominously, private holders were diversifying out of dollars
• . . ,"4 which required official holders to increase their dollar reserves.
Accordingly, on August 15, 1971, the United States suspended dollar
convertibility into gold for fear that requests would generate a run on
gold reserves. Intense international negotiations ensued, resulting in
the Smithsonian Agreement, which included a generalized realignment
of pegged currencies that eventually succumbed to an even more wide-
spread general float of currencies beginning in 1972.45 Eventually
guidelines were negotiated to manage the floating of exchange rates.
These guidelines were ultimately replaced by the IMF's exercising sur-
veillance over exchange rates.' According to Professor Dam, these
guidelines "have historical importance [because they represent] the first
attempt to develop a set of rules for a floating system [of exchange
rates] comparable to the Bretton Woods rules for a par value system."'4
Professor Dam continues his analysis of the post-Bretton Woods
era by charting the changing roles of the SDR, gold, and the dollar in
charge of debts, so too the first amendment to the Articles required ac-
ceptance of the SDR.
THE RULES OF THE GAME 153.
40. Id at 152-53.
41. Id at 151-68.
42. Id at ch. 6.
43. The three countries were Canada, 1950-1962 and 1970, Germany in 1969 and
1971, and the Netherlands in 1971. Id at 176.
44. Id at 187.
45. Id at 189-92.
46. IZd at 259.
47. Id at 199.
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an era of floating exchange rates and limited intervention into foreign
currency markets.4 He then surveys the changes in the IMF as an or-
ganization,49 devoting a chapter to the Jamaica Agreement,5 ° which
presaged a thorough reform of the Articles to prepare for the period of
floating currency rates. Thereafter, Professor Dam illustrates how spe-
cial accounts, or "windows," became available for: (1) drawings for
balance of payments problems arising from export fluctuations;
(2) buffer stock financing requirements; and (3) sharp increases in oil
prices. During this analysis, Dam elucidates how all of these changes
ave increased the IMF's financial and organizational complexity.5'
By now the persevering reader has obtained a very brief glimpse of
the breadth of Kenneth Dam's endeavor. Undertaking no less a task
than to place into historical context the economic and diplomatic de-
velopments that have influenced the institutional and legal develop-
ment of international monetary affairs, this book deserves to be read by
the serious student, the informed generalist, and even by the over-
worked executive who may give an "expletive deleted" about monetary
affairs. All of us owe Kenneth W. Dam a debt for producing a volume
so completely backed by the "hard currency" of high scholarship.
48. Id at 243-47 (SDR, gold, and the dollar); 269-81 (gold and the dollar); 307-10
(SDR); 336-41 (gold).
49. Id at 251-52; 281-84.
50. Id at ch. 8.
51. Id at 284-87.
[Vol. 12
